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Abstract—The fifth-generation (5G) mobile networks aim to
host different types of services on the same physical infras-
tructure. Network slicing is considered as the key enabler for
achieving this goal. Although there is some progress in applying
and implementing network slicing in the context of 5G, the
security and performance of network slicing still have many
open research questions. In this paper, we propose the first
OSM-WireGuard framework and its lifecycle. We implement
the WireGuard secure network tunneling protocol in a 5G
network to provide a VPN-as-a-Service (VPNaaS) functionality
for virtualized network functions. We demonstrate that OSM
instantiates WireGuard-enabled services up and running in 4
min 26 sec, with potential the initialization time to go down to 2
min 44 sec if the operator prepares images with a pre-installed
and up-to-date version of WireGuard before the on-boarding
process. We also show that the OSM-WireGuard framework
provides considerable enhancement of up to 5.3 times higher
network throughput and up to 41% lower latency compared
to OpenVPN. The reported results show that the proposed
framework is a promising solution for providing traffic isolation
with strict latency and throughput requirements.
Keywords: 5G security, VPNaaS, Traffic isolation, Private
networks, WireGuard, Orchestration, OSM, PoC.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the 5G architecture is still evolving, the security threat
landscape of 5G has grown enormously due to the unprece-
dented increase in types of services and the number of
devices [1]. 5G is expected to deliver simultaneous services
with different latency, throughput, connectivity, and security
requirements. These services should be provided on the same
infrastructure with the help of network slicing. The key feature
of network slicing is the capability to virtualize the under-
lying infrastructure and create independent logical networks
[2]. It follows Software-Defined Networking (SDN) [3], [4]
and Network Function Virtualization (NFV) [5] principles by
decoupling the network functions, such as firewalls, load-
balancers, proxy servers, intrusion detectors, and others, from
proprietary hardware appliances and running them as software
in virtual machines (VMs). These different functions are called
Virtualized Network Functions (VNFs).
Service function chaining is a technique for selecting and
steering data traffic flows through various network functions,
i.e., it interconnects the VNFs in a specific order via virtual
links to provide a complete end-to-end service. The VNFs,
network services, and network slices run on top of the NFV
Infrastructure (NFVI). ETSI has done a significant amount of
work for monitoring and orchestration of VNFs [6]. The high-
level NFV management framework, proposed by ETSI, has
three functional blocks:
• The Infrastructure block, composed of the NFVI and Vir-
tualized Infrastructure Manager (VIM), is responsible for
providing the virtualization environment for the VNFs.
The VIM performs the lifecycle management of virtual
resources, such as virtual machines, storage, networking,
and connectivity.
• The VNFs, network services, and network slices block
includes the collection of VNFs, and the composition of
VNFs into network services to form network slices.
• The Management and Orchestration (MANO) component,
which controls the lifecycle of the VNFs, network ser-
vices, and network slices, including their configuration
and monitoring.
In 5G networks, there will be a portfolio of isolation tech-
nologies available rather than a single technology like a Virtual
Private Network (VPN). Thus, it will be necessary to integrate
and manage a variety of isolation mechanisms on different
levels. Moreover, there are different levels of slice isolation:
isolation of traffic, isolation of bandwidth, isolation of pro-
cessing, and isolation of storage [7], [8]. References [7], [8]
outline only the challenges of providing slice isolation without
proposing solutions. In particular, reference [7] lists several
potential slice isolation technologies such as tag-based slices
isolation, VLAN-based network slices isolation, VPN-based
slices isolation with IPsec, Secure Socket Layer/Transport
Layer Security (SSL/TLS), Secure Socket Tunneling Protocol
(SSTP), SSH (Secure Shell) and SDN-based isolation.
We focus on a VPN solution for isolation of traffic, meaning
that the data flow of one slice cannot move to and be accessed
from another slice, although they are using the same VNF(s).
We even further extend the concept of traffic isolation to
security isolation, i.e., the property that an unauthorized party
outside the slice, for instance, another user of the same
infrastructure but belonging to another slice, cannot modify
or even eavesdrop the traffic flow of the slice [9]. This also
provides confidentiality and integrity protection of the tenant’s
traffic even against the Mobile Network Operator (MNO).
For instance, a tenant that needs a network fit for a specific
use case rents a slice from the infrastructure provider. The
network slice is then used by the tenant to provide a network
service to the end-users. There is no other way to guarantee
confidentiality unless the data is encrypted.
ar
X
iv
:2
01
0.
03
84
9v
1 
 [c
s.N
I] 
 8 
Oc
t 2
02
0
Our contribution: In this paper, we present a Proof-of-
Concept (PoC) for creating an overlay network that ensures
the confidentiality of data passing between VNFs in a 5G
network slice with the integration of Open Source MANO
(OSM), which is one of the dominant service orchestrators,
and the efficient VPN technology - WireGuard. We present
the first OSM-WireGuard framework and its lifecycle. The
northbound interface of OSM, combined with juju proxy
charms, allows us to manage the WireGuard infrastructure
with our API easily. The performance results show that the
proposed framework is a promising solution for providing
traffic isolation in slices with strict latency and throughput
requirements. This is the first application and implementation
of WireGuard in a 5G network setting where OSM facilitates
the configuration and key distribution; thus, it opens new
potentials for both technologies.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Technical background
OpenStack 1 is a cloud operating system providing
Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) orchestration, and fault and
service management to operators. In our framework, Open-
Stack acts as a VIM hosting the base images, referred to as
Virtual Deployment Units (VDUs), on which the VNFs are
instantiated and the virtual network infrastructure connect-
ing the VNFs. OSM handles the rest of the orchestration,
configuration, and management of VNFs by interacting with
OpenStack to set up the network services.
Open Source MANO (OSM) 2 is a tool developed by ETSI
for the management and orchestration of VNFs. OSM makes
use of Virtualized Network Function Descriptors (VNFDs),
which adhere to the unified VNF catalogue, to describe all
VNFs and network services in a standard way. VNFs are
packed into VNF packages, which include the VNFD, config-
uration scripts, and other artifacts. Operators can then combine
these packages to describe their network service, in a Network
Service Descriptor (NSDs), and then again combine NSDs to
provide a network slice instance.
In the OSM community [10], the process of producing a
VNF package, making the package functional by satisfying its
lifecycle stages, creating network service, and consequently, a
network slice is known as the VNF on-boarding process. This
process consists of three stages, which are known as Day-0,
Day-1, and Day-2. They all revolve around the full lifecycle
of a single VNF package.
• Day-0: Determines all necessary elements of a VNF
package for its successful instantiation, and sets up its
management, so it is possible to configure the VNF later.
The main requirements in this stage are: describing differ-
ent involved components of the VNF (the essential VDUs
for hosting VNFs), designating NFVI requirements, in-
dicating topology and management mechanism for the
1https://www.openstack.org/
2https://osm.etsi.org
VNF, stipulating the certain Linux images and cloud-init
files, and identifying the instantiation parameters.
• Day-1: The VNF is instantiated and configured to enable
the continuous delivery of its service. It grants the capa-
bility to instantiate and initialize the necessary parameters
to configure the VNF in order to provide the expected
network service. The essential steps in this stage are:
classifying dependencies between the involved VNF com-
ponents and determining the fundamental configuration
for service initialization.
• Day-2: Provides all necessary elements for the VNF
package to be fully operational. It gives the possibility to
re-configure VNFs’ operations and modify them during
the runtime process. Day-2 operations include reconfigu-
ration, monitoring of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs),
and automatic scaling based on KPIs’ status.
We use OSM to deploy VNFs, network services, and network
slices, and to manage and orchestrate WireGuard.
Juju 3 is one of the main VNF Managers (VNFMs) for
OSM. It works by interacting with charms that act as a
structured VNFM for VNFs on the NFVI. A charm holds all
the necessary hooks to manage the lifecycle of a VNF, such as
deployment, configuration, and exposing services to external
processes.
WireGuard is a new protocol for secure network tunneling
proposed in 2017 [11]. It aims to replace IPsec and TLS-
based solutions for most use cases. WireGuard demonstrates
that it is possible to implement a secure network tunnel, using
state of the art cryptography in less than 4000 lines of code.
Reported results show that WireGuard outshines both IPsec
and OpenVPN in terms of throughput and ping time.
WireGuard’s approach to key distribution is agnostic and
relies on out-of-band mechanisms. It operates solely on layer
3 and works by associating public keys with IP addresses,
and it identifies peers strictly by their public key. We explain
it with a simple example, taken from [11].
When the sender transmits a packet out the wg0 interface,
it consults the cryptographic key routing table, shown in
Figure 1, to determine which public key to use for encryption.
For instance, a packet destined to 10.192.122.4 would
be encrypted with the TrMv...WXX0 public key. This also
works for receiving packets; if the interface wg0 receives a
packet, after decryption and authentication, it will only accept
the packet if the IP address resolves in the table to the public
key used in the secure session for decrypting it. This process
dramatically simplifies firewall rules from an administrative
perspective, because any packet arriving on the WireGuard
interface will have a reliable authentic source IP address.
The following example applies to implement a secure net-
work tunnel in a mobile network environment where mobility
is a priority. Given the two cryptographic key routing tables
shown in Figure 2, where the peer identified by the public
key gN65...z6EA in Figure 2(a) has configured the cryp-
tographic key routing table to contain an endpoint for the
3https://jaas.ai
Fig. 1. The cryptographic key routing table of a host 1a [12].
peer HIgo...8ykw, and changed the IP address and port of
the WireGuard interface to 192.95.5.64:21841. The host
gN65...z6EA sends an encrypted packet to HIgo...8ykw
at 192.95.5.69:41414. When HIgo...8ykw receives
the packet, it learns that the endpoint for sending a reply has
changed. Thus, it updates the table in Figure 2(b) and ensures
that the reply reaches the new endpoint.
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. The cryptographic key routing table for a mobile scenario [12].
B. Related Work
In [1], a threat analysis is presented, in the context of NFV
based network services and a conceptual design framework for
NFV based security management and service orchestration, ac-
cording to the ETSI-NFV MANO framework. Authors argued
that the tenants’ lack of visibility and control over the network
resources might lead to security threats and vulnerabilities. The
tenant only has access to the prepared VNF and not to the
image before build time; therefore, it is hard for the tenant to
know how data is accessed. Thus, the NFV ecosystem relies on
VNF providers that follow best practices and allow as much
transparency as possible into their VNF - to avoid security
incidents. They concluded that even though there are several
ETSI-NFV MANO implementations, few of them focus on
NFV security management and orchestration. Their proposed
conceptual framework, secMANO, expands the ETSI NFV
MANO framework by including security orchestration and
policy components. secMANO provides security functions as
a service, such as access control to NFV resources. Recently,
much has happened in the ETSI-NFV MANO ecosystem.
OSM introduced Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), which
restricts access to OSM API calls and ensures that only
authorized tenants can interact with the NFV resources, which
motivates our choice for an orchestrator and the relevance of
our proposed framework.
Reference [13] identifies the need for per-flow encryption
in between chained NFVs and, in this way, to isolate the end-
user traffic between VNFs. It presents the Software Defined
Security Associations (SD-SA) component as an alternative
to the Internet Security Key Exchange protocol (IPsec-IKE).
IPsec-IKE is not applicable inside a VNF due to the lack
of bidirectional data plane communication channels between
chained VNFs. SD-SA automates the dynamic VPNs estab-
lishment in a NFV domain by introducing the VNF manager
and SDN controller, where the last is omitted from the
implementation. In our work, we use the latest technologies
for encryption and orchestration.
The use of WireGuard as a VPN for future industrial
systems has been investigated in [14]. The reported results con-
firm that WireGuard outperforms IPsec in terms of throughput
and latency on different hardware platforms. Reference [15]
discusses the use of WireGuard as an open-source solution
for ensuring secure communications on the transport layer in
terms of confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity for future
decentralized industrial IoT infrastructures. The automatic
establishment of secure authenticated connections, harder DoS
attacks, less resource consuming cryptographic primitives,
better throughput performance, simple setup, and code of
fewer than 4000 lines that also allows formal verification
make WireGuard an appealing solution for embedded IoT
appliances. These are the key objectives of WireGuard that
motivated us to develop a PoC of using WireGuard as a VPN
solution in 5G. Private 5G networks tailored for a specific
enterprise will certainly foster Industry 4.0 [9].
A group of NFV vendors showcased how to built a virtual-
ized multi-vendor LTE Packet Core on top of OpenStack and
commercial-off-the-shelf servers orchestrated by OSM [16].
They realized a site-to-site VPN. The difference is that we aim
to provide a point-to-point solution for VPN. Since VNFs are
instantiated in multiple domains of the network architecture,
a tenant might want the confidentiality of the traffic between
the VNFs secured in a true end-to-end fashion.
III. OSM-WIREGUARD FRAMEWORK
Here we present the main contribution of this paper: the
OSM-WireGuard framework where OSM manages and orches-
trates services in a network that provides a VPN tunnel be-
tween endpoints in a virtualized 5G environment. OSM works
by utilizing its extensive information model aligned with
ETSI-NFV, which makes it possible to model and automate the
lifecycle of VNFs, network services, and network slices. OSM
has several ways to support the configuration of WireGuard
on each VNF. In the proposed OSM-WireGuard framework,
illustrated in Figure 3, the OSM Northbound Interface (OSM-
NBI), in combination with Juju proxy charms, manages the
WireGuard-enabled VNFs running on NFVI through OSM
actions. The use of proxy charms with the OSM-NBI allows
script configurations on the VNFs. The charms make it easy
to expose functions to the administrator to define tasks such
Fig. 3. Our proposed OSM-WireGuard framework, where the NBI of OSM
makes use of the extensive information model to minimize integration efforts
of network operators. Proxy charms are used to configure VNFs deployed on
the NFVI [6].
as key generation, adding and deleting peers, starting and
stopping the WireGuard service, and gathering performance
metrics. In our case, the administrator uses the OSM-NBI
to configure peering relationships between gateways, which
allows the RBAC feature to control configuration access of the
gateways. The installed VIM is Microstack, a minimal version
of OpenStack, with only the core components installed. To
run OSM and the proxy charms, we use Microk8s. Note
that Microk8s performance satisfies our needs for this first
attempt towards integrating OSM and WireGuard, since the
launched VDUs in this implementation do not demand very
high computational tasks. The technical specifications of the
testbed are listed in Table I. The commands and files used
during the installation and configuration of the testbed can be
found in [17].
A. OSM-WireGuard lifecycle
Day-1 and Day-2 of the three days lifecycle impact directly
the configuration of WireGuard in the network service. Adding
VNF configuration with OSM requires defining our configura-
tion primitives in the VNFD before we specify them in detail
in our proxy charm. Adding primitives to the VNFD simplifies
the process and oversight of the generated API to verify and
manage it, as it provides us with a detailed list that can be
read as documentation of the configuration primitives and their
instantiation parameters. OSM’s NBI allows the administrator
to configure these primitives when creating the network service
through additional YAML files, which automate the process. A
simplified version of the lifecycle is given in Figure 4, which
TABLE I
HARDWARE AND OS USED FOR THE MICROSTACK.
Host OS Ubuntu 18.04 Bionic
Memory 32 GB
CPU Intel i7-4790
NIC NetXtreme BCM5722
Fig. 4. Lifecycle of the WireGuard VPN-as-a-Service solution with OSM.
portrays the interaction between components in the framework
for each day of the lifecycle.
Day-0
The administrator must first retrieve the VNF and network
service packages, make sure the hardware requirements are
met, upload the packages to the OSM platform through the
NBI, and confirm that a compatible Ubuntu image exists on
the connected VIMs. The administrator then utilizes the OSM-
NBI to launch an instance of the network service and make
the VNFs manageable from OSM itself.
Day-1
During this process, as illustrated with the Day-1 arrow in
Figure 4, OSM deploys Juju charms to instantiate the network
service, according to the parameters given at instantiation
time. The process is also depicted in Figure 3. The extra
configurations included with –config are used to specify instan-
tiation parameters, which make it simpler to effectively launch
the service and customize the network service’s attributes
according to the network service provider’s needs.
Day-2
When the network service is instantiated, and all
WireGuard-enabled VNFs are running on their specific VDUs,
the network service is ready to be operated at runtime. By
this point, the administrator can use the OSM-NBI, and the
actions add-peer and del-peer to manage peering relationships
between new WireGuard-enabled VNFs while running Day-
2 operations. During this time, the OSM KPI monitoring
framework can also be used to monitor the performance of
the WireGuard gateways, and if there is a need to enhance the
performance, OSM can scale the gateways accordingly.
To further connect the WireGuard-enabled network service
with other network services, forming a network slice, the
administrator can use the Connection Points and Virtual Link
Descriptors, which are part of the Network Slice Template.
Through the Connection Points, modularity is achieved, and
the WireGuard-enabled network service can easily be inte-
grated with the existing infrastructure to provide confidential-
ity where needed.
Fig. 5. OpenStack’s network topology shows the two WireGuard gateways
connected to the tunnel network and the test VMs.
B. Building a network service
Here we list the steps of building the VNF and network
service packages.
1) Use a minimal Ubuntu Server 18.04 image to create a
baseline for the VDU and install WireGuard through
cloud-init during the instantiation of the VNF.
2) Create the VNF package, configure the YAML files, and
set path variables in order to create the Juju charm.
3) Define the list of actions used by the Juju charm
framework.
4) Build the charm, export it to the VNF package, and
verify that the VNFD is valid.
5) Create the NS package, which includes the required
VNFs.
6) Update the YAML file with the NSD and validate the
NSD.
7) Compress the packages and upload them to OSM.
8) When OSM creates an instance of the network service,
the Resource Orchestrator (RO) of OSM instructs the
connected VIM to spin up the described NFVI. The out-
come of the process is the network topology displayed
in Figure 5.
9) Connect the two WireGuard gateways by adding the
peer’s public key to the configuration file for the wg0
interface, along with the peer’s IP on the VPN, the
subnet we want to connect to, and finally, the public
endpoint connected top the tunnel-network created by
the VIM.
10) Instantiate the network service.
Since network slices are nothing but combined network
services in an explicit order, we can see that there are only a
few additional steps about configuring the YAML files and the
Juju charm framework compared to the steps for network slice
instantiation in OSM, as described in [18]. The simplicity and
efficiency of WireGuard are apparent as the simple command-
line interface makes it easy to understand how most of the
process of launching a tunnel network with WireGuard is
going to proceed. One thing to note is that with WireGuard’s
simplicity, it also becomes a necessity to script or use external
tools to solve cases with increased complexity. However,
the simplicity is an intended feature to avoid cases such as
IPsec, which have myriads of configurations the administrator
can choose from - and therefore increase the probability of
introducing vulnerabilities through misconfigurations.
C. Key distribution
Since WireGuard relies on an out-of-band process to per-
form key distribution, we chose to use Juju proxy charms to
handle the creation of peering relationships. During Day-1, the
public and private keys of each VNF are generated, while the
keys are retrieved through SSH, and distributed with add-peer
during Day-2.
D. Summary
The process of instantiating the WireGuard network service
is shown in Figure 6. The figure also includes some of the key
performance indicators (KPIs), On-boarding Process Delay
(OPD), and Deployment Process Delay (DPD), which we
present in the next Section. The process begins when the
operator uses the OSM-NBI to call ns-create. OSM then logs
the instantiation parameters in its database, and the internal
RO unit utilizes the OpenStack API to deploy the necessary
NFVI. When the deployment of the NFVI is complete, the
RO updates the status on OSM’s shared message bus, which
initiates the configuration of the VNFs. The Juju Controller,
which acts as the VNF configuration and abstraction unit,
now executes the primitives from the initial-config-primitive
section to instantiate the network service. After observing that
the VNFs are configured, the operator extracts the public key
from each VNF and uses it while calling the ns-action add-
peer, which initiates the process of adding a peer to the VNF’s
WireGuard configuration. At this point, the network service
instance is operational and ready to serve connected network
services involved in the network slice. The commands and files
for the installation and configuration of the framework can be
found in [17].
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
One of the goals of 5G-PPP is reducing the average service
creation time cycle from 90 hours to 90 minutes [19]. We
use and measure the KPIs defined by Yilma et al. in [20].
On-boarding Process Delay (OPD) is the time it takes to
boot-up a virtualized network function image. Deployment
Process Delay (DPD) is the time-delay introduced by de-
ploying and instantiating the VNF on the VM to produce
an operational network service. A summary of the measured
OSM-WireGuard framework’s KPIs can be found in Table II.
The service’s OPD is 159 seconds, while the DPD ends at
107 seconds. This means that the total time from the point we
initiate our VNF image until the instance is ready to provide
the required service is 266 seconds. During the on-boarding
Fig. 6. The process of instantiating the WireGuard network service through
the use of the OSM-NBI.
TABLE II
SERVICE CREATION TIME.
NVF-MANO KPI Time
On-boarding Process Delay 159 s
Deployment Process Delay 107 s
process, the installation of WireGuard takes 102 seconds,
making it the largest contribution to the OPD. The DPD
includes the action add-peer but excludes the time it takes for
the admin to perform ssh connection onto the gateways and
extract the public keys - which means that the configuration
due to the initial-config-primitives takes 47 seconds.
We also compare the throughput and latency of WireGuard
and OpenVPN with default settings to determine the benefits
of using WireGuard instead of OpenVPN. To test the through-
put of our network service, we use iperf between the gateway
nodes and average the results over 30 minutes. The tests are
first performed while WireGuard is active on the two gateways.
Then, we stop the WireGuard service, install an OpenVPN
server on one gateway, and use the other as a client before
running iperf between the nodes again. The tests show that
with our configurations, WireGuard has a 5.3 times higher
throughput than OpenVPN.
Measuring latency is done by using the ping tool to send
1000 ICMP Requests, and record the average latency between
TABLE III
NETWORK SERVICE ACTION PRIMITIVES.
Action Time
add-peer 60 s
del-peer 51 s
Fig. 7. Throughput of WireGuard and OpenVPN between the gateway nodes
averaged over 30 minutes with iperf.
Fig. 8. Average latency, after 1000 ICMP requests between a gateway and a
peering subnet’s interface on the gateway.
the gateway and a subnetwork on the opposite side of the VPN
tunnel. As Figure 8 illustrates, packets traveling through the
WireGuard VPN have an average latency of 41% lower than
those through OpenVPN.
The performance analysis of the operational KPIs makes
it clear that OSM combined with WireGuard can be used to
provide VPNaaS while still being in line with the requirement
of 90 min for the service creation time. The total time that
OSM uses to instantiate the network service with two VNFs
is 266 seconds, and it can be reduced by about 102 seconds
if the operator prepares images used in the VM with a pre-
installed and up-to-date version of WireGuard before the on-
boarding process. By pre-configuring the images, it is also
possible to eliminate actions performed by the Juju charms
such as enabling forwarding. Alternatively, the cloud-init API
can be used to create the public and private keys on each
VNF as well, which would be faster than the Juju charms’
additional delay due to their atomic operations. However, as a
design decision, it makes more sense to utilize the Juju charms
for the generation of keys, as it allows network services that
require regeneration of the keys to move the primitive to the
standard config primitives, which makes it simple to use the
primitive during Day-2 operations. The throughput and latency
results of WireGuard and OpenVPN resemble those reported
in [12].
V. CONCLUSIONS
We presented the first PoC of providing VPN-as-a-Service
in 5G with the use of the WireGuard network tunneling
protocol and OSM for management and orchestration of VNFs.
The reported performance results show that WireGuard is a
more promising protocol compared to OpenVPN, in particular
for network slices with low latency and high throughput
requirements. Thus, WireGuard should be considered a prime
candidate for traffic isolation by means of a VPN.
As future work, we plan to investigate a scenario where
the network service or a VNF protected by the WireGuard
network service migrates to a new location. In this case, we
should use the OpenStack migration features and WireGuard’s
ability to handle handover.
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